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Defendants raise several issues in their Brief on Appeal that 
must be addressed in this Reply Brief. However, because the trail 
court's grants of Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment resolved 
multiple claims and issues, none of the issues that will be dealt 
with hererin are entirely dispostive of the case. Taken together, 
however, the Defendants raise three primary arguments and then cite 
the trial court and other authority in support of their allegations 
that Plaintiffs have failed, as a matter of law, to make and prove 
the factual allegations necessary to prevail upon their nine separate 
causes of action. 
This reply brief will address the issues raised by Defendants1 
Brief on Appeal as they are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
One of the principal issues raised by the Defendants is the 
issue of whether Plaintiffs' Affidavits contradict their deposition 
testimony, or contain inadmissible hearsay. This issue is not 
properly before the Court on appeal, given that the trial court 
refused to rule on Defendants' Motion. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' 
Affidavits and Verified Complaint are the only significant 
evidentiary testimony in the record with regard to the second Motion 
for Summary Judgment, given that Plaintiffs depositions have never 
been entered into the record before the trial court. Finally, it is 
uncontestable that the trial court reviewed these affidavits, since 
they are cited directly in the trial court's Memorandum Decision. 
1 
The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Jeanette 
Lynton could not be found personally liable for the actions of people 
who were allegedly her agents- The question of precisely which legal 
entity—the Nevada corporation, or Jeanette Lynton as an individual— 
was operating the Orem plant between August 1992 and January 5, 1993 
was a question of materially disputed fact, not of law. It was 
therefore inappropriate for the trial court to decide this issue in 
favor of Defendant Lynton at Summary Judgment. 
The trial court also erred in ruling as a matter of law that 
Plaintiffs had to prove actual damages in order to establish their 
prima facie claims. The trial court applied the damage rule 
appropriate to negligence actions, rather than the rule applicable to 
actions for damages based on intentional torts. Eight of plaintiffs' 
nine causes of action fall into the category of dignitary, or 
intentional, torts. As a matter of law, nominal damages are 
available for technical violations of these torts, and in most cases 
emotional damages are presumed, regardless of whether or not there is 
expert testimony to support them. 
Finally, the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that, for one reason or another, plaintiffs had failed to allege or 
prove one or more necessary elements of each of their nine causes of 
action. 
Because the trial court erred on so many different issues, the 
cumulative effect of these errors was a gross miscarriage of justice, 
when the trial court granted both of the Defendants' Motions for 
2 
Summary Judgment. Therefore, the trial courts' orders should be 
reversed, and this case should be remanded for trial on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants1 Allegations of Plaintiffs Hearsay and Conflicting 
Testimony are not ripe for determination. 
Throughout their Brief on Appeal, Defendants attempt to 
discredit the testimony Plaintiffs offered in their Affidavits 
attached to their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants1 refer in their "Statement 
of Facts" to the alleged hearsay evidence contained in these 
affidavits. This issue, and Defendants' additional arguments 
regarding the alleged conflicts between Plaintiffs1 affidavit 
testimony and their deposition testimony are not properly before this 
Court, and cannot be decided. This is the case because these issues 
were, as the Defendants1 point out, raised in their Motion to Strike 
and/or to Disregard Portions of the Affidavits. Plaintiffs responded 
in substantial and complete detail to Defendants1 Motion. However, 
the Trial Court expressly declined to rule on this Motion in its 
Memorandum Decision: 
Because the Court has found no genuine issue of material 
fact exists and defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law, the Court need not address defendants1 Motion to 
Strike and/or to Disregard Portions of Plaintiffs1 Affidavits.1 
Because the Trial Court did not rule in this Motion, these issues are 
not ripe for review or determination by this Court.2 Furthermore, 
1
 Record, p. 685. 
2
 Should this Court wish to review these issues anyway, 
the Plaintiffs will quite willingly rest their case on their 
Memorandum in Objection to Defendants' Motion to Strike, Record 
3 
because the Trial Court refused to rule on this Motion to Strike, and 
because the Trail Court cites to the disputed affidavits in its 
Memorandum Decision, it must be presumed, on appeal, that the 
contents of the affidavits were properly part of the record 
considered in determining whether to grant Defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
It appears that Defendants would prefer to substitute the 
Plaintiffs1 deposition testimony. However, it is clear from the 
record that this testimony was not before the trial court when it 
determined these motions for summary judgment. Although both parties 
cite various portions of the depositions in their Memorandum, the 
fact of the matter is that with one minor exception,3 none of the 
deposition testimony had been entered in evidence before the trial 
court, and indeed the deposition transcript was the subject of some 
controversy.4 The Utah Supreme Court faced a similar situation in the 
case of Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co., In that case, the Court 
stated: 
pp 636-680. It is the Plaintiffs' position that the 
Defendants' contentions are quite competently answered and 
disposed of in that Objection. 
3
 Plaintiffs attached copies of eleven pages of their 
deposition testimony to their Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Jeanette Lynton's Motion for Summary Judgment. These 
pages are the only parts of the depositions that have been 
entered into evidence. 
4
 See, e.g., Plaintiffs' "Statement of Attorney Regarding 
Corrections to Plaintiffs' Depositions," Record, pp. 177-164; 
Defendants' "Motion to Supress Depositions," Record p. 221; 
Defendants' "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Supress 
Depositions," Record, pp. 226-222; Plaintiffs' "Objection to 
Use of English Transcript," pp. 297-294. 
4 
We consider only the pleadings, depositions, admissions, answers 
to interrogatories, and affidavits properly before the trial 
court judge. Papers not properly filed with the trial court 
will not be considered. Depositions that were never introduced 
into evidence nor read by the trial judge will not be considered 
on appeal.5 
As in that case, the deposition testimony in the present matter has 
never been entered into evidence. The only applicable record 
testimony before the trial court was the Plaintiffs1 original 
verified complaint,6 an affidavit of Defendant Jeanette Lynton,7 an 
affidavit of Brian Lancaster,8 defendants1 "Answer to Plaintiffs1 
First set of Interrogatories,"9 and the affidavits plaintiffs 
submitted in support of their Objection to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment.10 This testimony, actually in the record, is the 
only evidence that can be considered by this court in reviewing this 
matter on appeal. 
The Issue of precisely what entity was doing business in Orem 
between August 1992 and January 1993—whether it was Jeanette 
Lynton, acting as an individual, or the Nevada corporation DOT 
Adventures—is a material disputed issue of fact, not a question 
of law. 
The facts on the record before the trial court when Defendant 
Lyntonfs Motion for Summary Judgment was decided were simple: 
5
 Pratt by and through Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irr. Co., 
813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991). 
6
 Record, pp. 9-1. 
7
 Record, pp. 135-128. 
8
 Record, pp. 85-79. 
9
 Record, pp. 286-251. 
10
 Record, pp. 457-419. 
1) Defendant Lynton was an officer of the Nevada corporation DOT 
Adventures, incorporated in 1989, and in good standing through 
1993.ai 
2) Defendant Lynton, as an individual, was the registered owner 
in Utah of the trademark D.O.T.S., Dozens of Terrific Stamps. 
This trademark was originally registered in the state of Utah in 
1989, and this registration was renewed in January 1992.12 
3) In August and December 1992 a business entity hired employees 
and began manufacturing rubber stamps with novelty designs in 
Orem, Utah.13 
4) The rubber stamps were sold under the trademark owned 
personally by Defendant Lynton—D.O.T.S., Dozens of Terrific 
Stamps.14 
5) The employees of the business entity were paid with checks on 
a purported corporate account. The corporate name on the checks 
was DOT Adventures, Inc., with the address of the Orem 
production facility.15 
6) During the period of time from August 1992 to January 1, 
1993, there was no corporate entity with this name on record 
with the Utah State Division of Corporations.16 
11
 Record, pp. 240-229, 
12
 Record, pp. 58-56. 
13
 Record, pp. 9-10. 
14
 Record, pp. 59-55. 
15
 Record, pp. 132-128, 
16
 Record, pp. 62-55. 
7) On January 5, 1993, the Nevada corporation, DOT Adventures, 
registered as a foreign corporation doing business in Utah under 
the name DOT Adventures, Inc.17 
8) On March 18, 1993, ownership of the D.O.T.S., Dozens of 
Terrific Stamps trademark/dba was transferred to the Nevada 
Corporation, DOT Adventures.18 
It is a disputed issue of material fact whether the entity 
manufacturing and selling stamps in Utah between August and January 
5, 1993 was the individual Jeanette Lynton, the owner of the 
trademark name underwhich the Orem stamps were marketed and sold, or 
Jeanette Lynton acting in her capacity as a corporate officer of the 
Nevada corporation DOT Adventures. In ruling as a matter of law that 
the entity was the Nevada corporation, DOT Adventures, the trial 
court inappropriately confused issues of fact with issues of law. 
It is a logical fallacy to argue as Defendant Lynton has argued19 
that because the Nevada corporation DOT Adventures was in good 
standing in Nevada during the entire period in question, and because 
the Nevada corporation DOT Adventures registered in January 1993 as a 
foreign corporation doing business in Utah under the name DOT 
Adventures, Inc., that, ipso facto, the entity doing business in Utah 
prior to January 1993 was also the Nevada corporation DOT Adventures. 
Plaintiffs are not, despite Defendants' arguments to the 
contrary, here arguing that the Nevada Corporation DOT Adventures has 
no standing to defend this case. Quite the contrary. As soon as 
Plaintiffs were notified of the existence of the Nevada corporation, 
and its alleged role in this matter, the Plaintiffs moved to amend 
17
 Record, p. 55. 
18
 Record, p. 56. 
19
 Appellee's Brief on Appeal, pp. 9-10, and 17. 
their complaint to add the Nevada corporation as an alternative 
defendant. 
But it is the Plaintiffs' position that the mere fact that the 
Nevada corporation DOT Adventures registered in January 1993 as a 
foreign corporation doing business in Utah under the name DOT 
Adventures, Inc. cannot establish as a matter of law or fact that 
this same Nevada corporation was the entity doing business in Utah 
under that name prior to registration—despite the similarity in the 
names being used. 
The registration required by law does unquestionably establish 
the prima facie case that all actions taken in Utah in the name of 
DOT Adventures Inc. after January 5, 1993, were taken by the Nevada 
corporation DOT Adventures. But as a matter of law, that 
registration says absolutely nothing about actions prior to 
registration. Because there was no business entity legally 
registered in Utah between August 1992 and January 5, 1993, the 
question of who, precisely, was operating the Orem factory is an 
issue of fact, not of law. The stamps were being sold during this 
time under a trademark that was registered as the personal property 
of Defendant Jeanette Lynton. There was testimony in the record that 
Defendant Esquivel represented Ms. Lynton to be the owner of the 
business.20 The only link on the record between the Nevada 
corporation DOT Adventures and the entity issuing paychecks between 
August and January is the similarity in the names, the January 1993 
legal registration that linked the two names, and the Affidavits of 
20
 Record, pp. 193-179. 
8 
Ms. Lynton and her accountant.21 The mere similarity of names does 
not establish as a matter of law that the business entities were 
identical, nor does the after-the-fact registration linking the two 
names. The credibility of Ms. Lynton's affidavit is questionable in 
this matter, and the affidavit testimony of Mr. Lancaster is 
inconclusive on this issue. Mr. Lancaster testifies clearly that the 
company records indicate that the Plaintiffs were employees of DOT 
Adventures, Inc. Plaintiffs are not disputing that this was the name 
on their paychecks. Mr. Lancaster further states that company 
records indicate that DOT Adventures, Inc. is a Nevada Corporation, 
doing business in Utah. Again, Plaintiffs do not dispute that this 
is what the official records indicate now. However, Mr. Lancaster's 
affidavit does not clarify whether corporate records between August 
1992 and January 5, 1993 also indicate that the Utah entity was a 
Nevada corporation. 
Plaintiffs asked, in their First Set of Interrogatories and 
Request for Production, for copies of "all business and/or management 
meeting minutes for the period of time between March 1992 and March 
1993."22 Defendants objected to this production request, and failed 
to provide any responsive documents.23 At oral argument on Defendant 
Lynton's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs requested either 
that Lynton's Motion be denied, or that, in the alternative, 
plaintiffs be allowed a continuance under Utah Rule of Civil 
Record, pp. 135-133/ 85-83. 
Record, p. 287. 
Record, p. 272. 
Procedure 56 (f), in order to pursue further discovery relating to 
this issue.24 Relevant evidence that might be dispositive of this 
issue would be proof as to which entity—Lynton as an individual, or 
the Nevada corporation DOT Adventures, paid sales and income tax on 
the profits of the business between the months of August 1992 and 
January 5, 1993. 
This factual issue is material. It bears directly on the 
question of who was employing Defendant Esquivel, and therefore who 
was ultimately responsible for his tortious actions. This issue of 
fact is disputed, and the evidence in the record is not conclusive as 
a matter of law. Therefore, the trial courtfs Order dismissing 
Jeanette Lynton as an individual defendant was in error, and should 
be reversed. 
The Trial Court's insistance that Plaintiffs provide proof of 
actual damages, allegedly as part of their prima facie case, 
necessary to prevail against Defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, was wrong as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint and Amended Complaint set forth 
allegations of nine separate causes of action. Some are particular 
to one or another of the Plaintiffs individually, some apply to all 
four. The causes of action are for Wrongful Detainer, Assault, 
Battery, False Imprisonment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and three 
counts of invasion of privacy in the form of intrusion into 
Plaintiffs1 private property and personal affairs.25 Eight of these 
24
 Record, p. 745. 
25
 Record, pp. 9-1; 107-99. 
10 
causes of action fall into a category of tort known as the dignatary 
tort.26 Professor Dan Dobbs, in his three volume treatise The Law of 
Remedies devotes an entire chapter to this special class of tort. 
After defining what torts are classified as dignitary, he states the 
following: 
All these dignatery harms may cause economic harm as well 
as affront to personality. If so, economic damages may be 
recovered. However, in a great many of the cases, the only harm 
is the affront to the plaintiff's dignity as a human being, the 
damage to his self-image, and the resulting mental distress. It 
does not follow that recovery is limited to nominal damages, 
however, even if the extent of the emotional distress is not 
proved. On the contrary, the traditional rule for "trespassory" 
cases like assaults and batteries, was that "general damages" or 
"presumed damages" of a substantial amount can be recovered 
merely upon showing that the tort was committed at all.21 
The undisputed facts of this case are that28: 
1) Plaintiff employees were detained for more than one hour in 
the cafeteria area of their place of employment—an area a 
substantial distance from the nearest door, such that Plaintiffs 
could not know if that door was locked or not.29 
2) Defendant Esquivel, the factory manager, in whom rested 
complete authority to hire and fire the factory employees, 
stated that, while he knew what he was doing was illegal, he did 
not care, and that all factory employees were going to have to 
submit to a search, one by one, in the bathrooms.30 
26
 See, e.g., Dobbs: The Law of Remedies, 2nd ed., Dan 
B. Dobbs (1993 West Publishing Company), Vol. 2, §7.1 (1), p. 
259. The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress 
does not fall into this category. 
27
 Ld./ italics added. 
28
 The record evidence in support of these facts is 
found in the Affidavits of plaintiffs and their relatives. The 
Spanish originals of these Affidavits are found in the Record 
at pp. 397-34 6. However, all citations are to the Amended 
Translations, properly attested to by the translators, and 
found in the Record at pp. 454-420. 
29
 Record, pp. 452, 447. 
30
 Record, pp. 439-438, 452. 
11 
3) Defendant Esquivel stated that if anyone wanted to object, 
they could, but that then everyone would know who the thief 
was.31 
4) Plaintiff employees were required one by one to enter the 
male or female bathroom respectively, with their supervisor, and 
submit to a search of their persons and personal property.32 
5) There was no rational basis for the search—there was no 
claim that the allegedly stolen $20.00 bill was uniquely 
identifiable, therefore even had a $20.00 bill been found in the 
search, there would have been no way to prove it was the one 
stolen.33 
6) Plaintiffs' personal property, including their wallets and 
lunch bags, were opened and searched.34 
7) Plaintiff Mazariegos was forced to pull her blouse out of 
her pants, undo her bra, and submit to her superisor placing her 
hands under the blouse and running her hands up around her 
midriff under the bra line. She was further required to take 
off her shoes and socks and roll up her pant legs. Finally, the 
supervisor took a pencil and picked through Ms. Mazariegos1 hair 
in a manner reminiscent of someone looking for lice.35 
These facts, despite Defendants1 claims to the contrary, state a 
prima facie case for wrongful detention; false imprisonment; assault; 
battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of 
privacy by intrusion upon seclusion. Plaintiffs were first 
threatened with an unlawful search. They were then required, 
implicitly, to chose between losing their employment or sitting idly 
by for more than one hour, instead of attending to the work which the 
Plaintiffs had hired on to do, and then one by one entering and 
remaining in a bathroom while their supervisors rifled through their 
wallets, pockets, purses, lunch sacks, or physically searched thier 
person—all in an illegal and completely pointless search for an 
Record, pp. 447, 439-438. 
Record, pp. 454-438. 
Record, p. 451. 
Id. 






unidentifiable twenty dollar bill. This entire situation was 
offensive to the dignity and personal integrity of the individuals 
involved. The Plaintiffs, and others who submitted to the search, 
felt they had no choice but to submit to this humilliation, because 
of the economic power Defendant Esquivel wielded in their lives. And 
yet the trial court found in part that because damages had not been 
proven, summary judgment was appropriate on all causes of action. 
Defendants' brief cites the discussion between Plaintiffs' 
counsel and the trial court during oral argument on this matter. 
What the Defendants fail to recognize, however, is that Plaintiffs' 
contention, both to the trial court and to this court on appeal, is 
that the trial court was in error in requiring plaintiffs to prove 
actual damages in order to prevail against the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. It seems apparent upon review both of this 
discussion at oral argument and of the trial court's final decision 
on this matter, that the trial court failed to make the distinction 
between the intentional torts here at issue, and other torts 
involving negligence. Negligence torts do require proof of damages 
for a plaintiff to prevail. Intentional torts do not. This 
distinction is clearly made in Dobbs, The Law of Remedies: 
The common law dignitary torts—a technical assault without 
physical harm, for example—are comparable to libel and slander 
in that they have traditionally supported damages for intangible 
injuries even when little or no economic or physical harm is 
done. The tort is said to damage in itself, or as more commonly 
put, the plaintiff can recover "general" or "presumed" damages 
in substantial or more-than-nominal amounts. 
This rule is quite different from the rule applied to many 
other torts, such as ordinary negligence torts, in which no 
13 
damages may be recovered unless physical or economic harm is 
first shown.36 
One of the primary basis on which the trial court granted Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment was a substantial discussion of damages. 
The trial court begins with the following statement of the incorrect 
legal rule: 
It is well known that, in a civil suit, damages may not be 
recovered unless the plaintiff can prove the existence of 
damages resulting to the plaintiff as a result of a legal wrong 
inflicted by the defendant Damages recoverable for a 
tort are limited to those damages directly attributable to the 
tort.37 
After this introductory paragraph, the trial court goes on to discuss 
the Plaintiffs1 failure to show any economic damages. The trial 
court then refuses to consider the psychological evidence that the 
court had itself requested, on the grounds that Dr. Mejia's expert 
report was not sworn in proper affidavit form, and was therefore 
inadmissible. The trial court concludes: 
Lacking any evidence that plaintiffs have incurred any 
monetary or psychological damage resulting from the search 
conducted by defendants, the Court finds that plaintiffs have no 
cause of action against defendants. Accordingly, defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.38 
This statement is a completely inaccurate statement of the law, and 
as such provides no basis for the trial court's grant of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. This statement is also a completely 
inaccurate statement of the facts of the case, but this issue will be 
addressed in the final section of this brief. Because the trial 
Dobbs, supra, § 7.3(2), at pp. 304-305. 
Record, p. 687 [quotation and citation omitted]. 
Record, p. 686-685. 
court so completely misunderstood the proper legal damage rules 
applicable to this case, the trial court's grant of Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment was inappropriate and should be reversed, 
and this matter remanded for trial on the merits. 
The Trial Court Erred in Holding, As a Matter of Law, that 
Plaintiffs1 Allegations and Testimony Failed to Establish 
the Necessary Prima Facie Case for Each of their Causes of 
Action. 
Defendants remaining arguments in their Brief on Appeal are 
essentially limited to their attempts to support the trial court's 
holding that Summary Judgment was appropriate because plaintiffs 
failed to establish a prima facie case for each of their causes of 
action. 
Wrongful Detention 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court held, as a matter of 
law, that Plaintiffs1 cause of action for wrongful detention failed 
because "plaintiffs have not proven that defendants substantially 
interfered with plaintiffs1 liberty. Plaintiffs knew the location of 
an exit and made no attempt to leave."39 (Defendants, in their brief 
on appeal, contend that a criminal statute does not create a cause of 
action in tort. However, this contention is also not properly before 
this Court, as the Trial Court considered this issue, but refused to 
rule on it.40) 
Contrary to the Trial Court's apparent understanding, the tort 
of wrongful detention, as defined in the Utah Code Annotated, §7 6-5-
39
 Record, p. 689. 
40
 See, Record, pp. 689-692. 
304, does not require that the Plaintiff attempt to leave. Rather, 
it requires a knowing, unlawful, restraint of another, so as to 
interfere substantially with his liberty. Esquivel stated that the 
search was illegal, but that he was going to require each employee to 
submit, regardless of the illegality.41 Esquivel further required the 
employees to remain for more than one hour in the cafeteria area, 
while they proceeded one by one to the bathrooms to be searched.42 
The employees were effectively restrained from continuing in the 
normal productive activities for which they had been employed. They 
were further restrained from leaving entirely by the barely implicit 
threat of losing their jobs, should they not submit.43 
In determining whether to grant or deny a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion.44 In the present case, it 
is reasonable to infer from the undisputed facts that Defendant 
Esquivelfs actions substantially interfered with the Plaintiffs1 
liberty to continue their daily productive routine in their work 
place. Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of this cause of 
action should be reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. 
Assault and Battery 
In dismissing Plaintiffs1 causes of action for assault and 
battery, the trial court stated that "The Court finds no evidence 
Record, pp. 452, 439-438. 








that defendant Esquivel intended the search of the plaintiffs to 
cause harmful or offensive contact, or to cause plaintiffs to be in 
imminent apprehension of such contact."45 Defendants argue in support 
of the trial courts' decision that these causes of action must fail 
because there is no allegation that Defendant Esquivel intended to 
cause the Plaintiffs any physical harm, nor did any of the Defendants 
offer any threats of bodily harm or violence. However, both the 
trial court and the defendants again completely misstate and 
misunderstand the legal principles involved. One hornbook explains 
the legal rule this way: 
To constitute a battery, [or assault, since the required 
intent is the same] the actor must have intended to bring about 
a harmful or offensive contact or to put the other party in 
apprehension thereof. A result is intended if the act is done 
for the purpose of accomplishing the result or with knowledge 
that to a substantial certainty such a result will ensue.46 
Plaintiffs have testified that the forced, illegal, search of their 
persons and personal property was offensive. Defendant Esquivel 
stated that he knew the search was illegal. From those two 
undisputed facts, it is reasonable to infer that Esquivel also knew 
that this type of search was illegal precisely because people found 
them offensive; therefore, it is also reasonable to infer that 
Esquivel knew that requiring forty of his employees to submit to such 
a search would offend them. These reasonable inferences from the 
undisputed facts are sufficient to support the Plaintiffs1 
45
 Record, p. 689-688. 
46
 The Law of Torts, 2nd ed. Fowler V. Harper, Fleming 
James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray (Little, Brown & Co., Boston) 
1986. § 3.3 pp. 272-273 [italics added]. 
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allegations that Defendant Esquivel intended to cause offensive 
contact to the Plaintiffs and the other employees when he required 
them to submit to a search of their persons and property. Because 
the reasonable inferences, drawn in Plaintiffs1 favor, are sufficient 
to indicate the strong probability, if not certainty, that Defendant 
Esquivel intended to cause offensive contact to his employees when he 
ordered them to submit to a physical search of their persons and 
property, the trial court erred in dismissing these two causes of 
action. The trial courts1 order, therefore, should be reversed and 
Plaintiffs1 causes of action for assault and battery should be 
remanded for trial on the merits. 
False Imprisonment 
In dismissing the Plaintiffs1 fourth cause of action for false 
imprisonment, the trial court again misstates the law and confuses a 
number of legal issues. The trial court asserted that: 
Regardless of whether plaintiffs consented to the search. . 
. plaintiffs voluntarily remained and submitted to the search. 
Even if plaintiffs were afraid of losing their employment, they 
submitted to the search without objecting or without attempting 
to leave the premises.47 
The trial court here claims to be ignoring the factual issue of 
whether or not the plaintiffs consented to the search. In reality, 
however, the trial court finds reasonable implied consent in the 
simple fact that the plaintiffs didn't object or attempt to leave. 
In other words, despite claims to the contrary, the trial court here 
rules as a matter of law that no reasonable jury would find that 
plaintiffs did not consent—simply because they failed to get up and 
47
 Record, p. 688. 
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try to walk out, or to jump up and object. As the Plaintiffs have 
discussed previously, in their brief on appeal, when consent is not 
express, but must be implied from the circumstances, whether consent 
exists or not is an issue of fact, that must be decided by a jury. 
The trial court erred when it ruled as a matter of law on this 
disputed factual issue. 
The trial court further ruled that dismissal of this cause of 
action was also appropriate because again, Plaintiffs were not 
confined, nor where they physically restrained. Defendants in their 
brief on appeal cite the case of Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement 
Co., 91 P.2d 507, (Utah 1939) and assert that this case is not on 
point because Hepworth was arrested. This assertion is mistaken. 
Hepworth was not arrested, but rather the dance hall security 
officers, wearing their regular police uniforms, but acting in a non-
police capacity, asked Hepworth to accompany them, and implicitly 
threatened him with arrest if he did not.48 Based on their uniforms, 
Hepworth believed them to have the power to arrest him, and therefore 
felt compelled to comply with their 'request.1 In the present case, 
Defendant Esquivel had the power to immediately terminate the 
employment of anyone who objected to the search. Esquivel himself 
had indicated that while he knew his actions were illegal, he didn't 
care. Esquivel also indicated that it would be presumed that any 
employee who objected was the thief. The Utah Supreme Court stated, 
in Hepworth: 
48
 Hepworth v. Covy Bros. Amusement Co., 91 P.2d 507, 
(Utah 1939). 
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If the words or conduct are such as to induce a reasonable 
apprehension of force, and the means of coercion are at hand, a 
person may be as effectually restrained and deprived of liberty 
as by prison bars.49 
The Utah Supreme Court did not determine in Hepworth whether the 
force need be physical. In the present case, the force was economic-
-plaintiffs and their co-workers reasonably assumed that anyone who 
objected or attempted to leave would lose their job. But the fact 
that the force was economic does not make the force Esquivel used in 
this case any less real than if he had held a gun to the Plaintiffs' 
heads. Esquivelfs means of coercion were readily at hand—he only 
had to say, "you're fired." Again, the reasonable inferences from 
the undisputed facts, drawn in favor of the Plaintiffs, support 
reversing and remanding this cause of action for trial on the merits. 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
In dismissing the Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action, the trial 
court held as a matter of law that none of the conduct alleged and 
testified to, both in deposition and in affidavit form, was 
sufficiently offensive to give rise to a cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In other words, on the 
uncontested facts of this case—the search, the hands running under 
Ms. Mazariego's blouse and around her midriff, the pencil picking 
through her hair—the trial court believed that it would be legally 
impossible for a jury to find that this was outrageous conduct 
sufficient to give rise to a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. It is the plaintiffs' position 
Id., at 509. 
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that the trial court erred, and that this cause of action, like the 
others, should be remanded for trial on the merits. 
Negligent (or Reckless) Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' sixth cause of action, for 
reckless or negligent infliction of emotional distress on the grounds 
that there 
was no evidence that the search was conducted in a manner 
which would involve an unreasonable risk of causing emotional 
distress or than any emotional distress might result in illness 
or bodily harm. Accordingly, the Court does not find any reason 
why defendants should have realized that such results might 
occur.50 
Defendants support the trial court!s dismissal of this cause of 
action with extensive reference to the alleged contradictions between 
Plaintiffs1 deposition testimony and affidavit testimony. As 
discussed previously, these issues are not properly before this 
court. The evidence properly before the court supports the following 
factual findings and reasonable inferences therefrom: 
1) Defendant Esquivel knew the search was illegal.51 
2) Defendant Esquivel ordered forty factory employees to submit 
to a physical search of their persons and property anyway.52 
3) It can be reasonably inferred that Defendant Esquivel knew 
that the search would be offensive and humilliating to the 
plaintiffs. 
4) It can further be reasonably inferred that Defendant 
Esquivel acted either intentionally to cause this humilliation 
and offense, or in reckless disregard for the fact that such 
offense and humilliation would result from the search. 
5) The affidavit testimony of the plaintiffs and their 
immediate family members testifies to the humilliation, 
Record, p. 687. 
Record, pp. 452, 439-438. 
Id., see also, Record pp. 449-442. 
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emotional, and in the case of Ms. Mazariegos, physical suffering 
this incident caused in their lives.53 
6) The affidavit testimony of Ms. Mazariegos and her sisters 
shows that her intense nervous condition, complete with such 
physical manifestations as a bloody discharge, were directly 
caused by the unlawful search and other tortious conduct of Mr. 
Esquivel .54 
Because the undisputed facts and reasonable inferences from the 
undisputed facts meet the necessary elements to establish a cause of 
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress on the part of 
Ms. Mazariegos, this cause of action should also be reversed and 
remanded for trial on the merits. 
Invasion of Privacy: Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
Plaintiffs' seventh, eighth and ninth causes of action are for 
invasion of privacy. The trial court dismissed these causes of 
action on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims of a physical search of 
their persons and personal property in the workplace, and intrusive 
questioning into highly personal affairs in an employment interview, 
did not constitute any invasion of plaintiffs private space. As 
Plaintiffs pointed out in their brief on appeal, the trial courts' 
holding effectively rules that no Utah employee has any reasonable 
expectation of any privacy, whatsoever, in their workplace. This is 
the case because on the facts of this case, the Defendants have 
intruded into about every private space of an employee, short of a 
strip search or direct questioning about their personal sex lives. 
Defendants have personally searched plaintiffs' purses, wallets, and 
lunch bags. Defendants have searched plaintiffs pockets, shoes, 
53
 Record, pp. 452-426. 
54
 Record, pp. 449-446, 436-432. 
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socks, bras, and hair. Defendants have asked about plaintiffs1 
worthiness to enter an LDS temple.55 
Employees are not property of their employer. Their personal 
affairs and personal property are their own, whether they are at home 
or on the job. While desks or lockers or other property of an 
employer might merely be loaned to an employee, their purses, wallets 
and pockets are still their own personal property, and plaintiff 
employees, like all other Utah employees, have a right to the privacy 
of that property. Plaintiffs have established the necessary prima 
facie case for an invasion of their privacy by intrusion upon 
seclusion. Despite the trial courts' assertions, and the Defendants' 
claims, intrusion upon seclusion is not limited to intrusion into 
onefs car or home. The search of a purse or wallet is a commonly 
used illustrative example of this type of invasion of privacy.56 
The requirements of a prima facie case are specific: 
1) an intrusion by the defendant(s) 
2) into a matter which the plaintiff has a right to keep 
private. 
3) by the use of a method which is objectionable to the 
reasonable person.57 
Plaintiffs' allegations, testimony, and the uncontested facts of this 
case are sufficient to establish this prima facie case in each of the 
three claims for intrusion upon seclusion which the Plaintiffs have 
raised. A physical search of one's person, pockets, purse, wallet or 
lunch bag constitutes a physical intrusion. Plaintiffs, even in 
Record, pp. 454-438. 
See, e.g., Privacy, 62A Am Jur 2d § 60, p. 683. 
Id., § 48, p. 673. 
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their capacity as employees of the Defendants, have a right to keep 
the contents of this extremely personal property private. A physical 
search of their personal property is generally illegal, without a 
warrant and probably cause. Thus, presumably such a search would be 
objectionable to a reasonable person. 
Equally, highly personal questions regarding one's religious 
affiliation and moral standing as determined by that religion, are 
intrusive. That religious affiliation and moral standing are also 
within a zone of personal affairs that plaintiff rightfully may 
expect to keep private. Requiring such questions to be answered in 
an employment interview would be offensive to a reasonable person. 
Because Plaintiffs' allegations meet the required prima facie 
case, these three causes of action for invasion of privacy should 
also be reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants claims that plaintiffs' affidavit testimony 
contradicts their deposition testimony are not properly addressed to 
this court because the trial court refused to rule on this issue, and 
Plaintiffs' deposition testimony was not properly entered on the 
record before the trial court, and therefore was not properly 
considered in determining defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Because this is the case, this Court also is unable to consider that 
deposition testimony in ruling on the merits of this matter. 
The question of precisely who was the responsible legal entity— 
whether it was Jeanette Lynton in her individual capacity, or 
Jeanette Lynton in her corporate capacity—is a materially disputed 
24 
issue of fact, and therefore the trial courts' ruling as a matter of 
law the Defendant Lynton was not liable was inappropriate and should 
be reversed, and this issue remanded for trial on the merits. 
The trial court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs had failed to 
state a cause of action on any of their nine claims because they had 
failed to establish actual damages. The proof required by the trial 
court is not applicable to cases of dignitary torts. Because the 
trial court applied the incorrect legal rule in this matter, the 
courts' ruling on this issue was in error, and should be reversed, 
and this matter remanded for trial on the merits. 
Finally, plaintiffs' affidavits and other testimony clearly 
establish the necessary elements of the prima facie cases required 
for each of their nine causes of action. Therefore, the trial 
court's Order dismissing all nine causes of action should be reversed 
and remanded for trial on the merits. 
Because the trial court erred in its rulings on each of these 
matters, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to reverse the 
trial courts' orders granting the Defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment, and remand this entire matter for trial on the merits of 
Plaintiffs' claims. 
DATED this day of April, 1996. 
MARTI L. JONES 
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